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Abstract 
The absolute pessimistic induction states that earlier theories, although successful, were 
abandoned, so current theories, although successful, will also be abandoned. By contrast, the 
relative pessimistic induction states that earlier theories, although superior to their 
predecessors, were discarded, so current theories, although superior to earlier theories, will 
also be discarded. Some pessimists would have us believe that the relative pessimistic 
induction avoids empirical progressivism. I argue, however, that it has the same problem as 
the absolute pessimistic induction, viz., either its premise is implausible or its conclusion 
does not probably follow from its premise. 
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The pessimistic induction (PI) asserts that “we are in the midst of an ongoing historical 
process in which our theoretical conceptions of nature will continue to change just as 
profoundly and fundamentally as they have in the past” (Stanford, 2015: 875). The PI is 
widely regarded as the most powerful criticism of scientific realism (Sankey, 2017: 201), the 
position that mature theories “are typically approximately true” (Putnam, 1975: 73). If the PI 
is cogent, i.e., if the premise is true, and if the premise makes the conclusion likely, we 
should believe that alternative theories will supersede current theories. 
A standard response to the PI is that current scientific theories are more successful than 
their forerunners (Devitt, 2011; Doppelt, 2014). In other words, current theories predict and 
explain more phenomena than their forerunners did. Consequently, the downfall of current 
theories cannot be inferred from that of earlier theories, and whether current theories will be 
superseded is an open issue. Let me call empirical progressivism the historical observation 
that new theories are empirically superior to old theories, i.e., scientific revolutions are 
accompanied by empirical progress. 
Empirical progressivism has begun to receive probing criticisms from philosophers. K. 
Brad Wray (2013) and Mario Alai (2017) contend that current theories, although more 
successful than their predecessors, will suffer the same fate. To justify this contention, they 
have constructed a new PI, which I call the relative pessimistic induction (RPI). The RPI is 
more sophisticated than the original PI, which I call the absolute pessimistic induction (API). 
This paper, however, aims to show that neither the API nor the RPI is cogent.  
Admittedly, achieving this aim does not count as establishing scientific realism. 
Refuting the two PIs and establishing scientific realism are different affairs. Establishing 
scientific realism requires not only refuting the two PIs, but also constructing positive 
arguments for it. This paper does not attempt to construct such arguments. 
In Section 2, I expound the API and the RPI. In Section 3, I criticize the API, arguing 
that either its premise is implausible, or its conclusion does not probably follow from its 
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premise. In Section 4, I raise the same objection to the RPI. In Section 5, I elucidate an 
implication of my objection to the API and the RPI for selectivism. In Section 6, I address 
five possible objections from pessimists. It will become clear that given how science has 
developed, pessimists cannot achieve both a plausible premise and a conclusion that is made 
probable by that premise. 
 
2. The Absolute and Relative Pessimistic Inductions 
Recall that according to empirical progressivism, current scientific theories are more 
successful than their precursors. In response, Wray (2013) states:  
 
..the previous generation could construct a similar argument with respect to the generation that 
preceded them. They had instruments their predecessors could not fathom, and they achieved 
degrees of accuracy never achieved before. The pattern is clear. What looks like a brave new 
world to our predecessors does not look new to us. And similarly what looks new to us will not 
look so new to our offspring. (Wray, 2013: 4327) 
 
Alai (2017) constructs a similar argument while responding to Gerald Doppelt (2014), who 
appeals to empirical progressivism to defend realism. Alai states that “even in the past 
empirical knowledge and scientific methodology had improved steadily: for instance, they 
had improved a lot from 100 A.D. to 1700 A.D., yet many wrong theories were still held at 
that date, and even thereafter” (Alai, 2017: 3282).  
Wray and Alai have constructed the RPI. Its premise states that earlier theories, 
although more successful than their predecessors, were discarded, and it concludes that 
current theories, although more successful than their forerunners, will also be discarded. This 
argument is named the relative pessimistic induction because it appeals to the relative notion 
that theories are more successful than their forerunners. 
The RPI contrasts with the API, according to which “the scientific theories of the past 
have turned out to be false despite exhibiting just the same impressive sorts of virtues that 
present theories do, so we should expect our own successful theories to ultimately suffer the 
same fate” (Stanford, 2006: 7). The premise of the API states that earlier theories, although 
successful, were abandoned, and its conclusion states that current theories, although 
successful, will also be abandoned. This argument is named the absolute pessimistic 
induction because it appeals to the absolute notion that past and current theories are 
successful. It appears that empirical progressivism nullifies the API, but not the RPI, and 
hence that the RPI is better than the API.  
Like other inductions, the API and the RPI are cogent or uncogent, depending on 
whether their premises are true, and whether their conclusions probably follow from their 
premises. In the next sections, I argue that neither the API nor the RPI can simultaneously 
meet these two conditions and, hence, that the RPI fares no better than the API at showing 
that current theories will follow the unfortunate path of their predecessors. 
 
3. Against the API 
The premise of the API is that earlier theories were overturned. Pessimists typically appeal to 
Larry Laudan’s (1981: 33) list and P. Kyle Stanford’s (2006: 19–20) list of earlier theories to 
support the premise. These lists include the humoral theory, the Ptolemaic theory, and so on. 
After providing his list, Laudan declares that “for every highly successful theory in the past 
of science which we now believe to be a genuinely referring theory, one could find half a 
dozen once successful theories which we now regard as substantially non-referring” (1981: 
35). After providing his list, Stanford declares that “the history of scientific inquiry itself 
offers a straightforward rationale for thinking that there typically are alternatives to our best 
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theories” (2006: 20). If Laudan and Stanford are right about the history of science, the 
premise of the API is plausible. 
Laudan’s and Stanford’s gloomy depictions of the history of science, however, clash 
with the bright depictions of historical optimists (Fahrbach, 2011; Park, 2011; Mizrahi, 2013, 
2016). Historical optimists point out that both Laudan’s and Stanford’s lists are biased in 
favor of absolute theories, such as the phlogiston theory and the Ptolemaic theory, which 
were discarded before the 20th century. They are called distant past theories, and should be 
distinguished from recent past ones. Recent past ones enjoyed acceptance during the 20th 
century. The theory of plate tectonics and the oxygen theory are examples of recent past 
theories. Some recent past theories were formulated before the 20th century, while others 
were formulation in the 20th century. All of them, however, were accepted in the 20th century. 
Interestingly, most of them are not yet rejected in the early 21st century. For example, the 
kinetic theory was accepted in the 20th century, and has not yet been rejected. Such theories 
are recent past-cum-current theories, i.e., they can be regarded as both recent past theories 
and current theories. Keep in mind that most recent past theories are still retained in the early 
21st century, so they also can be seen as current theories. 
Most past theories are recent past ones. Only a handful are distant past ones. Ludwig 
Fahrbach states that “at least 95% of all scientific work ever done has been done since 1915” 
(2011: 149). Park says that “the body of scientific knowledge exploded in the 20th century” 
(2011: 79). Moti Mizrahi (2013: 3219–3220, 2016) employs the random sampling method to 
demonstrate that most past theories are recent past ones. This optimistic portrayal of the 
history of science is called historical optimism (Park, 2017a: 616). It implies that most past 
theories are not overthrown yet, and it confutes the premise of the API that earlier theories 
were overthrown. 
How would absolute pessimists respond to this objection that the premise of the API is 
false? They might replace it with a new one: distant past theories were overturned. This new 
premise would not clash with historical optimism, which says nothing about what portion of 
distant past theories are retained and discarded. 
A new problem, however, would then arise for absolute pessimists. Empirical 
progressivism implies that it is fallacious to infer that because distant past theories were 
discarded, current ones will also be discarded. We should not investigate distant past theories, 
but rather recent past ones, to predict the course of current ones because “only the fate of our 
most recently developed theories are relevant to determining what we can expect of today’s 
best theories” (Wray, 2015: 63). To use an analogy, suppose you are twenty years old, and a 
disease has spread to your community. You are more likely to get the disease, if the disease 
has so far attacked people up to eighteen years old than if it has only attacked people up to 
five years old, given that your resistance to disease is likely more similar to that of eighteen 
year olds than to that of five year olds. Thus, you should investigate eighteen year olds, rather 
than five year olds, to estimate how probable it is that you will contract the disease. Similarly, 
current theories are more likely to be thrown out, if recent past ones were thrown out than if 
distant past ones were thrown out, given that the capacity of current theories to explain and 
predict phenomena more resembles that of recent past ones than that of distant past ones. So 
pessimists should investigate recent past theories, rather than distant past ones, to gauge the 
probability that current ones will be ousted. 
Admittedly, this analogy breaks down at some point. Five, eighteen, and twenty year 
olds exist simultaneously, but distant past, recent past, and present theories do not.1 This 
criticism against the analogy, however, does not refute the suggestion that we should 
                                           
1 I thank an anonymous referee for this sharp observation. 
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investigate not distant past theories but rather recent past ones to predict the course of current 
ones because the level of success of current theories is more similar to that of recent past 
theories that to that of distant past theories.  
In sum, the premise of the API states either that distant past theories were overturned 
or that recent past theories were overturned. If it states that distant past theories were 
overturned, the premise is plausible, or at least does not clash with historical optimism, but 
the conclusion does not probably follow.  If it states that recent past theories were overturned, 
the conclusion probably follows, but the premise is implausible. What if the premise states 
that both distant and recent past theories were overturned? The premise is still implausible, 
given that historical optimism suggests that the former group is much smaller than the latter. 
Therefore, empirical progressivism and historical optimism jointly thwart absolute pessimists’ 
aspiration to have both a plausible premise and a conclusion that probably follows from the 
premise.  
 
4. Against the RPI 
The RPI holds that earlier theories, although more successful than their predecessors, were 
ousted, so current theories, although more successful than forerunners, will also be ousted. 
Like the API, the RPI has either an implausible premise or an unjustified conclusion, 
depending on whether ‘earlier theories’ refers to distant past theories or recent past theories.  
If ‘earlier theories’ refers to distant past theories, the premise is plausible, i.e., it is 
plausible that distant past theories, although more successful than their predecessors, were 
ousted. The conclusion, however, does not probably follow from this premise. Empirical 
progressivism invalidates the pessimistic inference, for example, that the miasma theory (a 
distant past theory) was ousted, although more successful than the humoral theory (the 
predecessor of the distant past theory), so the germ theory (a present theory) will be also 
ousted, although more successful than the miasma theory (a distant past theory).  
If ‘earlier theories’ refers to recent past theories, then the inference is legitimate, i.e., it 
is legitimate to infer that recent past theories, although more successful than their precursors, 
were ousted, so current theories, although more successful than their precursors, will also be 
ousted. This premise, however, is implausible. For example, it would be legitimate to infer 
that since the germ theory (a recent past theory) was ousted, although more successful than 
the miasma theory (a distant past theory), so the germ theory (a present theory) will also be 
ousted, although more successful than the miasma theory (a distant past theory). But the 
premise is false, i.e., it is false that the germ theory (a recent past theory) was ousted. 
Pessimists might admit that the pessimistic inference from distant past theories to 
current ones is weak in the case of the API, since current ones are much more successful than 
distant past ones. They might maintain, however, that it is by no means obvious that it is 
weak in the case of the RPI, for distant past ones were only a little more successful than their 
immediate predecessors, yet they were overturned; exactly in the same way, it can be argued, 
current ones will be discarded because they are only a little more successful than their 
immediate predecessors. Thus, there is the same relation between distant past theories and 
their immediate predecessors, and between current theories and their immediate predecessors. 
Therefore, the RPI is fully warranted.  
Historical optimism suggests, however, that the immediate predecessors of current 
theories are distant past ones, and they are far less successful than current ones. I will assume  
however, for the sake of argument, that current theories are only a little more successful than 
their immediate predecessors (distant past theories), and that distant past ones were also only 
a little more successful than their immediate predecessors. Even under such conditions, we 
can show that the RPI is fallacious, using the following two examples.  
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Suppose that the water in a kettle gets hotter little by little. The temperature of the 
water is 98 °C at T1, 99 °C at T2, and 100 °C at T3. One makes the following inference: The 
water at T2 was just a little hotter than at T1, and it did not boil, so it will not boil at T3 
because it is just a little hotter than at T2. This inference is fallacious. A moral is that a little 
increase in temperature may make a big difference, viz., a difference between boiling and not 
boiling. In other words, from the fact that a little increase in temperature did not make a big 
difference, it does not follow that another little increase will not make a big difference. 
To take another example, suppose John and Tom are running a marathon. John is just 
one step ahead of Tom at times T1 and T2. John has not yet reached the final destination at T1, 
but he has reached the final destination at T2. One makes the following inference: Since John 
was just a step ahead of Tom at T1, and was not the winner of the race, so he will not be the 
winner of the race at T2, because he is still just a step ahead of Tom. This inference is 
fallacious. A moral is that a small lead in a race may make a big difference, viz., the 
difference between winning and losing. In other words, from the fact that a small lead in a 
race did not make a big difference earlier in the race, it does not follow that it will not make a 
big difference later in the race.  
Such examples can be extended ad nauseam. They all show that the conclusion of the 
RPI does not follow from its premise, even if we assume that new theories are only a little 
more successful than their predecessors. It is simply fallacious to infer that since distant past 
theories were abandoned, although only a little more successful than their precursors, so too 
current theories will be abandoned, although just a little more successful than their 
predecessors. Just a little increase in success could make a big difference, viz., the difference 
between being retained and discarded. In other words, from the fact that a little increase in 
success did not make a big difference at an earlier point, it does not follow that it will not 
make a big difference at a disparate later point.  
Pessimists might object that there is a relevant difference between scientific theories 
and the water in the kettle or the marathon racers. Water has a boiling point; races have a 
finish line. This is not so in theory development; alternative theories will keep replacing 
accepted theories indefinitely, and we will never arrive at a true theory.2  
This suggestion, however, conflicts with the presupposition of both the API and the 
RPI, which are built upon “proportional pessimism: as theories are discarded, the inductive 
rationale for concluding that the next theories will be discarded grows stronger” (Park, 2016: 
835). Consider, for example, that the humoral theory was superseded by the miasma theory, 
and that the miasma theory by the germ theory. According to proportional pessimism, the 
inductive rationale for the falsity of the germ theory is stronger than it was for the falsity of 
the miasma theory, because germ theory has two false forerunners whereas the miasma 
theory had only one false forerunner, and the inductive rationale for the falsity of the miasma 
theory, in turn, was stronger than that for the falsity of the humoral theory (Park, 2016: 838). 
The referee’s suggestion, however, implies that all three theories are all equiprobable, i.e., 
that they are all 0% probable, given that there are infinitely many theories of disease. In 
general, a theory is 0% probable if it has infinitely many rivals. Therefore, we should reject 
the referee’s suggestion and/or both the API and the RPI. 
 
5. Implication for Selectivism 
In Sections 3 and 4, I argued that either the premises of the API and the RPI are implausible, 
or their conclusions do not follow from the premises. This criticism against the API and the 
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RPI has a negative implication for selectivism, including structuralism, as advocated by John 
Worrall (1989), Stathis Psillos (1999: Chapter 6, 2009), and Peter Vickers (2017).  
Selectivism asserts that a scientific theory is composed of credible and incredible 
theoretical constituents. The credible constituents fuel the theory’s success, survive scientific 
revolutions, and carry over to the theory’s successor. Meanwhile, incredible constituents do 
not. Note that, like pessimism, selectivism presupposes that current theories will be 
superseded by future successors. This presupposition leads selectivists to attempt to come up 
with criteria for distinguishing between the believable and unbelievable posits of current 
theories. Thus, selectivism and pessimism share the prediction that scientific revolutions will 
oust current theories (Park, 2017b: 65; Stanford, 2018: 79). This prediction, however, is 
dubious, given that neither the RPI nor the API is cogent. 
Selectivism should be distinguished from scientific realism. Scientific realists do not 
believe that current theories will succumb to scientific upheavals, so they do not try to 
distinguish between the trustworthy and untrustworthy posits of current theories. Selectivism, 
which is regarded as a form of scientific realism, is usually called selective realism in the 
literature. It is not well-known, however, that there is not much of a difference between 
selectivism and pessimism. As Stanford argues, it is not clear that the theoretical assumptions 
common to both past and current theories are rich and thick enough to entitle selectivists to 
say that the theories are approximately true (Stanford, 2015: 875). Stanford is right on this 
count. I believe that “pessimists might covet selectivism” (Park, 2018a: Section 3.3). For this 
reason, this paper uses ‘selectivism’ instead of ‘selective realism.’ 
 
6. Objections and Replies 
6.1. Possibility vs. Likelihood 
Pessimists might withdraw their view that it is likely that current theories will undergo 
scientific revolutions, and put forward a new view that it is possible that current theories will 
undergo scientific revolutions. This new position is not refuted by my contention that neither 
the API nor the RPI is cogent. 
This mere possibility, however, is compatible with scientific realism according to 
which current theories “are typically approximately true” (Putnam, 1975: 73). We should 
interpret scientific realism “not as saying that present theories are definitely approximately 
true, but as saying that they are likely to be approximately true” (Park, 2017b: 71). Scientific 
realists do not rule out the possibility that current theories will undergo scientific revolutions. 
Thus, it is not the mere possibility but rather a high probability that is required to refute 
scientific realism. 
 
6.2. Scientists’ Capability 
Let me address another possible objection from pessimists. To get around empirical 
progressivism, Stanford (2006) claims that just as past scientists could not ideate current 
theories, so they now cannot ideate future successors. Scientists are all “creatures whose 
cognitive constitutions are not well suited to the task of exhausting the kinds of spaces of 
serious candidate theoretical explanations from which our scientific theories are drawn” 
(Stanford, 2006: 45). Therefore, current theories, although superior to earlier ones, will be 
surpassed by future successors.  
Historical optimism, however, can nullify this strategy, suggesting that most past 
theories have been retained, so “past scientists conceived of most of their future theories” 
(Park, 2017a: 618). Stanford is thus wrong to say that scientists of the past could not entertain 
current theories. As a matter of fact, past scientists did conceive of most current theories. If 
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pessimists want to refute this conclusion, they should show that most recent past theories are 
distinct from current ones. 
 
6.3. General Relativity and Quantum Theory 
Pessimists might raise another objection. Some recent past theories are definitely false. For 
example, general relativity and quantum theory conflict with each other, as do the different 
interpretations of quantum mechanics. General relativity and quantum theory are recent past 
theories, although they are also current theories. Therefore, historical optimism is false. 
This objection commits the straw man fallacy. Historical optimism does not assert that 
all recent past theories have remained unrefuted. Rather, it asserts that most recent past 
theories have remained unrefuted. Thus, it remains unscathed, even if both general relativity 
and quantum theory prove to be false.  
It is worth mentioning that the inconsistency between general relativity and quantum 
theory does not show that both of them will be supplanted by future successors. While it is, of 
course, possible that both of them will be, it is also possible that neither of them will be. After 
all, it is possible that consistency between them will be achieved through a minor 
modification of one or both of them. And it is also possible that only one of them will be 
supplanted.  In short, their future developments are underdetermined by their present status 
(Park, 2015: 223). 
 
6.4. Significant vs. Insignificant 
How might pessimists respond to Mizrahi’s random sampling? They might argue that 
emphasizing the number of scientific theories is not the best strategy for painting an 
optimistic picture of the history of science. It might be that the majority of recent past 
theories, which have been retained, are insignificant, while the minority of recent past 
theories, which have been discarded, are significant. Significant theories are those on which 
many other theories depend, and those whose truth is presumed for theory-building in many 
disciplines. Consequently, showing that a large number of insignificant theories were stable 
would be insufficient to justify historical optimism.  
This objection, however, does not successfully strike at historical optimism. Historical 
optimism is not refuted by the mere possibility, but rather only by the likelihood, that the 
majority of retained ones are insignificant, and that the minority of discarded ones are 
significant. It is much harder to establish this likelihood than it is to merely point out the 
possibility, and this much harder work is required to refute historical optimism. 
 
6.5. Müller’s Objection 
Pessimists might also raise the following objection. In the discussion over the PI, realists 
have argued that we are at a time in history where the quality of science is sufficiently good, 
i.e., current theories are successful enough to warrant the realist belief that they are true. No 
realist, however, has developed a good argument to show that now is that time. Müller states 
that it “is not at all obvious why science, or at least our current best theories, should have 
achieved a degree of success that warrants their truth” (2015: 406). 
As mentioned in Section 1, however, this paper does not aim to establish scientific 
realism. Interested readers can find a summary of several new arguments for scientific 
realism in Park (forthcoming, Section 2). All these arguments are distinct from each other, 
and from the no-miracles argument defended by Hilary Putnam (1975: 73). Different realist 
answers to Müller’s objection can be extrapolated from those arguments. For example, Park 
(2018b: 57–59) argues that special relativity has been reinforced by several scientific tests, 
such as those using atomic clocks and fast-flying jets. Those tests were not yet conceived 
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when Einstein proposed his theory. It follows that special relativity will be bolstered by an 
unlimited number of heretofore unconceived scientific tests. Therefore, it is warranted now. 
 
7. Conclusion 
The API says that earlier theories, although successful, were overthrown, so current theories, 
although successful, will also be overthrown. The RPI says that earlier theories, although 
more successful than their predecessors, were ousted, so current theories, although more 
successful than their forerunners, will also be ousted.  
The API and RPI are subject to the same criticism. The phrase ‘earlier theories’ in their 
premises either refers to distant past theories or recent past theories. If it refers to distant past 
theories, the two premises are plausible, but empirical progressivism nullifies the inferences 
from the premises to the conclusions. If it refers to recent past theories, the inferences are 
legitimate, but historical optimism confutes the premises. 
Therefore, empirical progressivism and historical optimism jointly make both the API 
and the RPI not cogent. They cast a damper over absolute and relative pessimists’ aspirations 
for both a plausible premise and a legitimate inference from that premise to the conclusion. 
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